Several policies would promote higher levels of work among welfare recipients, which is especially necessary while benefit rolls remain elevated despite plentiful job openings.
According to recent research by our AEI colleague Angela Rachidi, less than one-third of households collecting SNAP benefits in 2019 included a current worker, and just 6 percent of SNAP-collecting households included a full-time worker. Since then, SNAP caseloads and especially benefit levels and program costs have grown considerably, and most current SNAP household heads are working age and not disabled.
Meanwhile, labor force participation rates remain historically low, especially for US natives. For example, the Center for Immigration Studies recently reported that, for US-born men ages 25 to 54 without a bachelor’s degree, labor force participation declined from 89.4 percent in 2000 to just 84.4 percent in April 2023, when the US unemployment rate was 3.4 percent, matching lows last seen in the 1960s. Better connecting current benefit recipients with work will increase their earnings and, coupled with generous tax credits for low-income workers, significantly raise their household incomes. That combination—earnings plus benefits—is the key to reducing poverty and ensuring that our welfare system promotes hope and upward mobility—not a lifetime of dependency.
Here’s how this proposal seeks to achieve all of that.
First, it would strengthen work requirements for recipients of cash welfare, food stamps, and public housing subsidies. That’s a familiar call from conservatives, and for good reason. In the past, work-based reforms of the nation’s cash welfare program successfully helped millions of low-income single parents increase their earnings, reducing their levels of poverty and dependence on welfare checks. But similar policies were either never applied to other programs, or have been regularly waived, and even the work requirements for cash welfare lost their bite over time. The bipartisan Fiscal Responsibility Act enacted in May adjusted some work requirements for cash welfare and food stamps, but other Republican-proposed reforms were left out. More needs to be done to connect millions of current benefit recipients with work, and that’s what these proposed reforms seek to do.
Other changes assumed in the budget also promote more work over welfare and other benefit receipt. For example, we understand the budget assumes extending the current-law requirement that child tax credit claimants have valid Social Security numbers that authorize them to work in order to claim those work-based benefits. That requirement expires in 2025 and ought to be extended. The Congressional Budget Office in 2022 found that extending this requirement would yield over $24 billion in savings over 10 years. Other assumed changes would strengthen work search requirements for unemployment benefit recipients, close loopholes that inappropriately expand eligibility for food stamps, and narrow benefit eligibility for noncitizens, consistent with longstanding US law.
As the Budget Committee considers these incremental changes, they should also review more comprehensive changes proposed in American Renewal: A Conservative Plan to Strengthen the Social Contract and Save the Country’s Finances. That AEI publication, edited by Rachidi and former House Speaker Paul Ryan, was released last fall. A chapter in that volume authored by Rachidi, Scott Winship, and one of us (Matt Weidinger), titled “A Safety Net for the Future: Overcoming the Root Causes of Poverty,” suggested a series of changes to promote more work and stronger families, backstopped by reforms to the financing of welfare programs. Those changes would reduce current financial incentives for state governments to prioritize bigger caseloads and instead financially reward states for realizing smaller caseloads and a larger number of recipients working. Other proposals in the volume focus on reforms to health care and disability benefits, as well as the tax code. These should be of interest to the Budget Committee, too, as it continues its important work.
Increasing upward mobility means helping more of our neighbors make the transition off the benefit rolls and into work. The Budget Committee is doing the right thing to seek more upward mobility and is off to a good start. But even if the changes in today’s proposal are enacted, there will still be much more left to do.
Learn more: Putting This Year’s Poverty Numbers in Context | Two Sentences Will Strengthen SNAP’s Support for Work | Work Is Essential to the American Dream | Labor Department Report Finds Pandemic Unemployment Program Had a Staggering 36 Percent Improper Payment Rate
The post House Budget Plan Proposes Commonsense Welfare Changes appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.
Re: China’s Forcible Repatriation of North Korean Refugees
Dear President Xi Jinping,
We are writing to express our concern about the resumption of forcible returns of North Koreans detained in the People’s Republic of China to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), which had stopped since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. We are concerned regarding news of North Korea’s border reopening, with the registration of around 200 athletes, coaches and officials to attend the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou, China (23 September to 8 October 2023), and your government’s resumption of forcible repatriations of reportedly 2,000 North Koreans detained in China.
The 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the DPRK (DPRK COI) found that the North Korean government committed crimes against humanity against persons forcibly repatriated from China. According to the DPRK COI, North Koreans who flee their country are at risk of torture, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and even execution and forced abortion and infanticide upon their forcible repatriation. However, China, which is a party to the UN Refugee Convention and Protocol and the Convention against Torture, which codify the principle of non-refoulement, continues to arbitrarily detain and hold North Korean escapees waiting for North Korea’s border opening to forcibly return them.
The DPRK COI recommended “China and other States” to “respect the principle of non-refoulement” and “abstain from forcibly repatriating any persons to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, unless the treatment there, as verified by international human rights monitors, markedly improves.” There has been no documentation of such improvement of treatment in North Korea. On 16 December 2013, the DPRK COI wrote a letter to Beijing summarizing its “concerns relating to China’s policy and practice of forced repatriation of DPRK citizens [including] particular concern about Chinese officials providing specific information on such persons to DPRK authorities,” and urging Beijing to “caution relevant officials that such conduct could amount to the aiding and abetting of crimes against humanity where repatriations and information exchanges are specifically directed towards or have the purpose of facilitating the commission of crimes against humanity in the DPRK.”
However, China’s policy and practice of forced repatriation of North Koreans has continued since then. During the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment sent a letter to Beijing bringing to its attention information concerning “the arrest, detention and threat of repatriation of at least 1,170 individuals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in China, who have been arrested and detained for over a year since the borders between the DPRK and China were shut in January 2020 due to COVID-19 concerns”. The letter also referred to information that “on 14 July 2021, [the Chinese government] repatriated over 50 individuals of the DPRK who had been detained over a year in Shenyang”.
At a conference entitled “Actions to Tackle Forced Repatriation of North Korean Escapees in China” held in Seoul on September 7, 2023, James Heenan, the Representative of OHCHR Seoul, stated that: “Credible reports suggest a large number of North Koreans have been reportedly detained by Chinese authorities [over the] last three years but whom the DPRK would not accept back into the country due to the border closure and other COVID-19 prevention measures. As the DPRK begins to reopen its borders, these individuals could be repatriated at any time. For those that do not wish to return, the repatriation would be forcible”.
The UN Special Procedures, including the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, and treaty bodies, especially the Committee against Torture and Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, have repeatedly called upon China to respect the principle of non-refoulement for North Korean escapees. Various countries have made the same recommendations to China during its Universal Periodic Reviews.
China claims to address North Korean escapees in accordance with China’s domestic law, international law and humanitarian principles. However, China has failed to institute the “screening process” for North Korean asylum seekers or to provide them with “temporary identity certificates issued by public security organs” under article 46 of the Exit and Entry Administration Law, enacted in 2012.
China justifies the deportation of North Koreans under the bilateral treaties with North Korea such as the Bilateral Agreement on Mutual Cooperation for the Maintenance of State Safety and Social Order (July 1998), which provides in article 4(1) that those “who do not hold legal documents or have used a crossing point not specified in the documents will be treated as illegal border crossers” and in article 4(2) that “[i]llegal border crossers will be returned to the other side with information on their identity and specific situation.” However, such bilateral treaties cannot enable the forced return of North Korean refugees in violation of the principle of non-refoulement under article 33 of the Refugee Convention and article 3 of the Torture Convention.
Moreover, any humanitarian consideration should result in the granting of a legal status for the North Korean escapees and the stopping of their deportations back to North Korea where torture, sexual and gender-based violence, forced abortion, imprisonment in brutal labor camps and even executions await them. We note that the UN Refugee Agency in 2004 categorized North Korean escapees in China as “persons of concern” meriting humanitarian protection and proposed that China create a special humanitarian status for them to provide them with temporary documentation, access to services, and repeatedly called for protection against refoulement.
The official slogan of the 19th Asian Games Hangzhou 2022 is “Heart to Heart, @Future.” As Martin Luther King, Jr. said, we will not only win our freedom for ourselves, we will so appeal to your heart and conscience that we will win you in the process, and our victory will be a double victory. In this regard, we urge you to officially end the policy of forcible repatriation of North Korean escapees and to implement the procedure for the individualized determination of refugee status.
Signature organizations and individuals (as of September 21, 2023):
Independent Crossbench Member of the House of Lords & Co-chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea
Former Commission of Inquiry (COI) member on the situation of human rights in the DPRK & current chair at the Helsinki Human Rights Committee in Serbia
Co-Chair Emeritus of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)
Former UN Special Rapporteur/Commission on Inquiry (COI) member on the situation of human rights in the DPRK
Former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar & Former Chairperson of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
Former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK
Seoul Peace Prize Recipient & President of Defense Forum Foundation (USA)
ACAT - Belgique (Action des Chrétiens pour l’Abolition de la Torture)
ACAT - France (Action des chrétiens pour l’abolition de la torture)
ACAT Germany (Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture)
ACAT UK (Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture)
Advocates for Human Rights
Anti-Death Penalty Asia Network (ADPAN)
Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD)
Asociación Pro-Búsqueda de Niñas y Niños Desaparecidos
Association of Family Members of the Disappeared
Balay Alternative Legal Advocates for Development in Mindanaw, Inc. (BALAOD Mindanaw)
Centro para la Apertura y el Desarrollo de América Latina (CADAL)
Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW)
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
Commission for Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS)
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)
Death Penalty Focus
Disarmament and Non-Violence
Federal Association of Vietnamese Refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany
Families of the Disappeared (FoD)
Free Jonas Burgos Movement
German Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (GCADP)
Human Rights Hub
Human Rights Watch (HRW)
Human Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF)
Ikatan Keluarga Orang Hilang Indonesia (IKOHI)
International Coalition Against Enforced Disappearances (ICAED)
International Coalition to Stop Crimes against Humanity in North Korea (ICNK)
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex (ILGA) Asia
Italian Federation for Human Rights (FIDU - Federazione Italiana Diritti Umani)
Judicial Reform Foundation (JRF)
Karapatan Alliance Philippines (KARAPATAN)
Korean War POW Family Association
Madres de Plaza de Mayo - Línea Fundadora
Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (NKnet)
North Korea Freedom Coalition (NKFC)
Peace and Hope International
Save North Korea
Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty (TAEDP)
Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG)
UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea
World Coalition Against the Death Penalty (WCADP)
 Kyodo News, “North Korea eyes sending 200-strong delegation to Asian Games in China”, May 13, 2023, North Korea eyes sending 200-strong delegation to Asian Games in China (accessed September 5, 2023).
 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK to the General Assembly (October 13, 2022), A/77/522, para. 9 (“The Special Rapporteur has received information that as many as 2,000 escapees from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are currently detained in China as “illegal migrants” and are at risk of being repatriated to their country once the border reopens.”), A/77/522 (accessed September 5, 2023).
 Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (7 February 2014), A/HRC/25/CRP.1, para. 1098-1114, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (accessed September 5, 2023).
 Id., paras. 380-434.
 Id., paras. 435-477.
 Id., para. 1221(a).
 Id., para. 1197.
 Joint allegation letter to China by Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; Miriam Estrada-Castillo, Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; and Nils Melzer, Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, JAL CHN 8/2021, August 23, 2021, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26571 (accessed September 5, 2023).
 Ha Chae-rim, “UN Human Rights Office Head Says “North Korean escapees in danger of torture if repatriated to North Korea; China should not forcibly repatriate” [유엔인권사무소장 “탈북민 북송시 고문위험…中, 강제송환 안돼”]”, Yonhap News, September 7, 2023 [in Korean], 유엔인권사무소장 "탈북민 북송시 고문위험…中, 강제송환 안돼" | 연합뉴스 (accessed September 10, 2023).
 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations on the ninth periodic report of China (May 31, 2023), CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/9, para. 29, CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/9 (accessed September 5, 2023); Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of China (February 3, 2016), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, paras. 46-48, CAT/C/CHN/CO/5 (accessed September 5, 2023); Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of China (December 12, 2008), CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, para. 26, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4 (accessed September 5, 2023).
 Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: China (including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China) (December 4, 2013), A/HRC/25/5, paras. 186.66, 186.241, 186.242 and 186.243, A/HRC/25/5 (accessed September 5, 2023).
 Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted at the 27th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress on June 30, 2012), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/laws\_regulations/2014/09/22/content\_281474988553532.htm (accessed September 5, 2023).
 The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Press Release, UNHCR chief calls on states to respect non-refoulement after North Koreans deported from Laos, May 30, 2013, https://www.unhcr.org/news/news-releases/unhcr-chief-calls-states-respect-non-refoulement-afternorth-koreans-deported (accessed September 7, 2023); Shin Hyon-hee, “UNHCR ups efforts to protect N.K. defectors,” Korea Herald, March 2, 2014, UNHCR ups efforts to protect N.K. defectors (accessed September 7, 2023).