“别人拉了个新群发红包但没拉你入群”:美中经济关系正发生的变化|外交事务

  • 在2023年,接受WTW调查的40%的企业受访者认为,美国和中国之间的经济脱钩可能会 “大大加强”。

  • 拜登政府试图打消这些担忧,主张 “去风险,而不是脱钩”。

  • 七国集团领导人在广岛峰会上也赞同这种做法。

  • 去风险的策略包括限制中国在战略部门的能力,减少他们对西方的影响力,并使企业经济风险多样化。

  • 数据显示,到目前为止还没有出现整体脱钩的情况,中美之间的货物贸易在去年创下历史新高。

  • 许多分析家怀疑有针对性的去风险会成功,而其他人则担心它将产生与脱钩相同的效果。

  • 大部分去风险的过程将由私营部门推动,比如美国试图将芯片生产转移回国内。

  • 美国需要与盟友协调其去风险战略,以防止北京利用他们之间的分歧。

  • 特朗普政府对中国商品征收关税标志着与中国不受约束的一体化时代的结束。

  • COVID-19大流行加速了这种转变,迫使公司重新审视对外国供应商的依赖。

  • 俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵加剧了这些担忧。

  • 拜登政府在去风险方面增加了一个战略视角,如阻止中国在战略部门的发展,增加供应链的弹性,以及减少美国对中国关键商品的依赖。

  • 对先进技术的出口控制,即将对美国对中国技术公司的对外投资进行筛选机制,以及鼓励将制造业和采购转移到美国和盟国的产业政策,都被作为胡萝卜和大棒的组合使用。

  • 中国的消费者越来越喜欢本土品牌,由于中国的国家监管机构经常将天平向国内冠军倾斜,中国企业现在更有效地与跨国企业竞争。

  • 由于中国的反间谍法,对咨询公司的突击检查,以及对外国人的出境禁令,商业环境变得更加不确定。

  • 由于在台湾问题上可能出现破坏性的升级,许多美国和西方公司已经开始重新考虑他们在中国的风险。

  • 尽管美中贸易战,美中货物贸易在2022年达到了历史新高,中国仍然是美国的第三大贸易伙伴。美中贸易的增长是由于价格上涨,两国之间的整体贸易增长比美国或中国与其他伙伴的贸易要慢得多。美国对中国的出口比预计水平低23%,而美国从中国的进口比战前的趋势低18%。

  • 去除风险对外国对华直接投资的影响最大,2022年外国对华直接投资暴跌了约一半。在中国的投资正变得更加集中于较小的公司,供应链也开始转变,但速度很慢。

  • 中国市场太大,太有价值,不能放弃,因为它占全球GDP的五分之一,拥有9亿人的消费阶层。去除风险需要牺牲收入和效率,完全断绝关系往往是不切实际的。

  • 由于本地竞争对手和政策不确定性等挑战,许多公司正在努力降低其在中国的风险。

  • 一些公司正在采取 "为中国而中国 "的战略,将其品牌和业务本地化,以满足当地市场的需要。

  • 其他企业则采取 "中国加一 "的策略,建立 "万一 "的供应链,以对冲来自中国的干扰。

  • 公司也在将总装或关键部件转移到中国境外,以避免 "中国制造 "的标签和美国的关税。

  • 中国公司正在积极主动地将生产要素从大陆转移到墨西哥和越南等国家。

  • 公司正在积极计划可能导致快速脱钩的危机情景。

  • 讨论最多的威胁是台湾问题的升级,但其他触发脱钩的因素可能包括南海危机、美国政府更加鹰派的政策变化,以及针对中国对俄罗斯致命援助的制裁。

  • 美国和中国之间的经济关系在未来十年不会明显减弱,但它将因去风险而被重塑。

  • 基础技术和新兴技术将可能被封锁在两个独立的生态系统中。

  • 更有针对性的限制可能会影响美国半导体设计和机械公司。

  • 由于中国在锂离子电池制造、太阳能电池板和清洁技术所需的关键矿物方面的主导地位,清洁能源供应链将保持大部分整合。

  • 由于绿地采矿项目需要很长时间才能产出,因此很快就不可能实现脱钩。

  • 消费技术和商品、奢侈品牌、工业产品和服务提供商仍将依赖中国。

  • 私营部门的去风险化努力将由公共政策来决定。

  • 美国必须说服盟友和合作伙伴采取共同战略。

  • 出口控制、投资限制和补贴在美国-欧洲超级集团实施时具有更大的力量。

  • 一个共同的西方去风险框架将加强,而不是削弱一个更强大的跨大西洋联盟的基础。

  • In 2023, 40% of corporate respondents surveyed by WTW believed that economic decoupling between the US and China was likely to “greatly strengthen”.

  • The Biden administration has sought to allay these fears, advocating for “de-risking, not decoupling”.

  • The G-7 leaders at the Hiroshima summit also endorsed this approach.

  • The strategy of de-risking involves limiting China’s abilities in strategic sectors, reducing their leverage over the West, and diversifying corporate economic exposure.

  • Data shows that no overall decoupling has occurred so far, with trade in goods between the US and China hitting an all-time high last year.

  • Many analysts doubt that targeted de-risking will succeed, while others worry that it will have the same effect as decoupling.

  • Much of the process of de-risking will be driven by the private sector, such as the US attempting to shift chip production back home.

  • The US needs to coordinate their de-risking strategy with allies to prevent Beijing from exploiting divisions between them.

  • The Trump administration’s tariffs on Chinese goods signaled the end of the era of unfettered integration with China.

  • The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this shift and forced companies to reexamine their dependence on foreign suppliers.

  • Russia’s invasion of Ukraine heightened these concerns.

  • The Biden administration has added a strategic lens to de-risking, such as thwarting China’s advancement in strategic sectors, increasing supply chain resilience, and reducing U.S. dependence on China for critical goods.

  • Export controls on advanced technology, an upcoming screening mechanism on outbound U.S. investment into Chinese technology companies, and industrial policies that encourage the relocation of manufacturing and sourcing to the United States and allied countries are being used as a combination of carrots and sticks.

  • Chinese consumers increasingly prefer local brands and Chinese firms now compete more effectively against multinational firms due to Chinese state regulators often tilting the scales in favor of domestic champions.

  • The business environment has become more uncertain due to China’s counter-espionage law, raids on advisory firms, and exit bans on foreigners.

  • Many U.S. and Western corporations have begun to rethink their exposure to China due to the possibility of a disruptive escalation over Taiwan.

  • Despite the US-China trade war, US-Chinese trade in goods reached a record high in 2022, and China remains the US’s third-largest trading partner. The increase in US-Chinese trade is due to price inflation, and the overall trade between the two countries is growing much slower than US or Chinese trade with other partners. US exports to China are 23% lower than their projected levels, and US imports from China are 18% below their pre-war trend.

  • De-risking has had the greatest effect on foreign direct investment into China, which has plummeted by around half in 2022. Investment in China is becoming more concentrated among a smaller set of firms, and supply chains are beginning to shift, but slowly.

  • The Chinese market is too big and valuable to abandon, as it accounts for one-fifth of global GDP and has a consumer class of 900 million people. De-risking requires sacrificing revenue and efficiency, and a full break is often impractical.

  • Many companies are working to de-risk their exposure to China due to challenges such as local competitors and policy uncertainty.

  • Some are adopting a “China for China” strategy, localizing their branding and operations to cater to the local market.

  • Others are pursuing a “China plus one” strategy, building just-in-case supply chains to hedge against a disruption from China.

  • Companies are also moving final assembly or critical components outside of China to avoid the “made in China” tag and U.S. tariffs.

  • Chinese companies are proactively moving elements of production out of the mainland to countries such as Mexico and Vietnam.

  • Companies are actively planning for crisis scenarios that could lead to rapid decoupling.

  • The most discussed threat is an escalation over Taiwan, but other triggers for decoupling could include a crisis in the South China Sea, policy changes from a more hawkish U.S. government, and sanctions in response to Chinese lethal aid to Russia.

  • The economic relationship between the US and China won’t significantly weaken over the coming decade, but it will be reshaped by de-risking.

  • Foundational and emerging technologies will likely be cordoned off into two separate ecosystems.

  • More targeted restrictions may impact US semiconductor design and machinery companies.

  • Clean energy supply chains will remain mostly integrated due to China’s dominance in lithium-ion battery manufacturing, solar panels, and critical minerals necessary for clean technologies.

  • Decoupling isn’t possible any time soon due to the length of time it takes for greenfield mining projects to deliver output.

  • Consumer technology and goods, luxury brands, industrial goods, and service providers will still rely on China.

  • Private sector de-risking efforts will be shaped by public policy.

  • The US must persuade allies and partners to pursue a common strategy.

  • Export controls, investment restrictions, and subsidies have more power when implemented by a US-European superbloc.

  • A shared Western framework for de-risking would strengthen, rather than erode, the foundations of a stronger transatlantic alliance.

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