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中国在2022年12月突然取消了繁重的 "新冠清零 "措施，对大量病例的涌现毫无准备。
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国家媒体声称这一决定是基于 “科学分析和精明的计算”，但实际上，执政的共产党无视医学专家，直到为时已晚。
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重新开放是在冬季来临的时候突然发生的，而冬季是病毒最容易传播的时候。
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许多老年人没有接种疫苗，药店缺乏抗病毒药物，医院没有足够的供应或工作人员。
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根据学术模型、20多次访谈、内部报告和指令，美联社的调查文章称，这导致了多达数十万起本可以避免的死亡。
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医院急诊拒绝了救护车，火葬场昼夜不停地焚烧尸体，而亲属则因缺乏储存空间而将死去的亲人拖到仓库里。
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美联社发现，在没有充分准备的情况下，过快开放的决定给国家带来了严重后果。
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中国成功地控制了该病毒两年，但是当高度传染性的奥秘克戎变体出现时，专家和官员担心新冠清零是不可持续的。顶级医学专家向国务院提交了准备逐步退出的建议，但在上海爆发疫情后，这些建议被压了下来。中国坚持进行大规模测试和隔离，动乱开始酝酿。
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中国最终屈服于压力，允许病毒在没有警告的情况下席卷而来，导致数十万至数百万人死亡。专家估计，如果有更好的疫苗接种和抗病毒药物，其中许多死亡是可以避免的。
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加州大学洛杉矶分校的流行病学家张作风说，如果中国有一个更早的退出计划，“许多死亡是可以避免的”。中国疾控中心的一位官员称这是 “绝对糟糕的时机”，并说重新开放没有准备。
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2021年底，中国公共卫生专家和领导人开始思考如何退出新冠清零政策。2022年3月提交了一份报告，其中包括推动中国的疫苗接种运动，增加ICU床位容量，储备抗病毒药物，以及命令有轻微新冠感染症状的病人留在家里的建议。它还建议将热带岛屿海南指定为试验区，以试验放松控制。
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然而，香港的一次混乱、致命的爆发给北京敲响了警钟，然后在三月，病毒开始在上海蔓延。起初，上海采取了一种轻松的方法，但由于邻近省份的担忧，最高领导层介入，分别在3月底和4月实施了部分和全面封锁。
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全面封锁导致居民因缺乏物资而感到愤怒和沮丧，但北京明确表示封锁将继续下去，强调 "零感染 "和坚持的重要性。
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在上海被封锁后，中国的公共卫生专家不再公开谈论为退出做准备。没有人敢公开挑战习近平支持的政策。一位专家告诉美联社，一些专家被列入中国媒体的黑名单。时任中国疾病预防控制中心主任的高福暗示有必要为退出做准备，而当时的总理李克强似乎对关于新冠清零如何压垮经济的抱怨表示同情。公共卫生专家们分成了几个阵营，梁万年主张新冠清零，其他人则认为这是不可持续的。
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卫生当局被不明确的数据、漫长的新冠疫情和更致命的毒株的机会吓坏了，他们可能一直在等待病毒进一步减弱，或者等待中国开发的新的、更有效的mRNA疫苗。他们没有紧迫感，他们认为他们有时间来优化整个过程。在党代会结束之前，冒着疫情爆发的风险是不可能的。
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上海的封锁从预期的八天延长到两个月。当上海重新开放时，距离中国关键的第二十次党代会仅有几个月的时间，在这次会议上，习近平有望被确认为有争议的、开创先例的第三任期。来自北京、上海和武汉的科学家们写了内部请愿书，敦促政府开始准备工作，但他们被告知在大会结束前保持沉默。
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中国官员采取了极端的措施来防止奥秘克戎的传播，包括将游客关在酒店里，对商人进行无限期的隔离，以及让工人住在国营弹药厂。
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在新疆和西藏，居民被残酷封锁，而那些未能控制住新冠的人被解雇。
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随着大会的临近，官员们开始隐瞒病例，采取秘密禁闭和隔离措施，并少报病例数量。地方政府在大规模检测和检疫设施上花费了数十亿美元，而公务员则被逼着去做检测或检疫工作。
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北京居民被派往遥远的检疫中心，并被要求不要在网上发布相关信息。
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在10月中旬的大会上，习近平的忠实拥护者以新的领导阵容跟随他上台，标志着他对党的完全统治。
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中国疾控中心首席流行病学家吴尊友批评北京市政府过度控制新冠疫情，称其 “没有科学依据”，有可能 “激化公众情绪，引起社会不满”。钟南山，一位因对武汉最初爆发的新冠疫情发出警报而闻名的医生，两次亲自写信给习近平，告诉他新冠清零是不可持续的，并敦促逐步重新开放。金融、贸易和制造业的商业人士也在幕后游说当局。
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重新开放的压力来自于全国各地爆发的疫情。中国最高级别的 "新冠沙皇"孙春兰召集了包括卫生、旅游和经济部门的专家，讨论调整北京的病毒政策。钟南山介绍了香港的数据，显示在该市上次爆发疫情后，奥秘克戎的死亡率很低。
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11月10日，习近平下令进行调整，坚持科学和精确的预防和控制。第二天，北京宣布了20项调整限制的新措施，如重新划分风险区和减少检疫时间。习近平明确表示，中国坚持零感染率，必要的防疫措施不能放松。
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中国政府希望在应对新冠大流行病时建立秩序，但由于来自高层的信号相互矛盾，其措施造成了混乱。地方政府不确定是开放还是关闭，而且政策经常变化。在河北省省会石家庄，官员们取消了大规模测试并开放城市，但几天后又恢复了严厉的措施。
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公众对这些措施的失望在11月底沸腾起来，导致了全国性的抗议活动。防暴警察开始行动，抗议活动被迅速平息，但领导层的语气发生了变化，导致人们呼吁放弃 "新冠清零 "的做法。12月1日，习近平主席告诉查尔斯-米歇尔，抗议活动是由对封锁感到失望的青年推动的。
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12月6日，习近平指示官员改变新冠防疫管制措施，第二天，中国卫生当局宣布了10项全面措施，有效地废除了管制。这一突然的重新开放让全国人民措手不及，导致急诊病房人满为患，黑市上的抗病毒药物价格高涨。为了转移批评，当局命令国家媒体大肆宣传，反驳来自美国和西方的错误说法。
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China suddenly scrapped onerous zero-COVID measures in December and was not prepared for a massive onslaught of cases.
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State media claimed the decision was based on “scientific analysis and shrewd calculation,” but in reality, the ruling Communist Party ignored medical experts until it was too late.
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The reopening came suddenly at the onset of winter, when the virus spreads most easily.
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Many older people were not vaccinated, pharmacies lacked antivirals, and hospitals didn’t have adequate supplies or staff.
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This led to as many as hundreds of thousands of deaths that could have been avoided, according to academic modeling, more than 20 interviews, internal reports, and directives.
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Hospitals turned away ambulances, crematoriums burned bodies around the clock, and relatives hauled dead loved ones to warehouses for lack of storage space.
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The AP found that the decision to open up too quickly and without adequate preparation had serious consequences for the country.
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China successfully controlled the virus for two years, but when the highly infectious omicron variant emerged, experts and officials worried that zero-COVID was unsustainable. Top medical experts submitted proposals to the State Council to prepare for a gradual exit, but these were silenced after an outbreak in Shanghai. The country stuck to mass testing and quarantining, and unrest began to simmer.
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China eventually yielded to the pressure and allowed the virus to sweep with no warning, resulting in hundreds of thousands to millions of deaths. Experts estimate that many of these deaths could have been prevented with better vaccination and antivirals.
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Zhang Zuo-Feng, an epidemiologist at UCLA, said that “many deaths could have been prevented” if China had had a plan to exit earlier. A China CDC official called it “absolutely bad timing” and said that the reopening was not prepared.
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At the end of 2021, Chinese public health experts and leaders began thinking about how to exit the zero-COVID policy. A report was submitted in March 2022, which included proposals to boost China’s vaccination campaign, increase ICU bed capacity, stock up on antivirals, and order patients with mild COVID-19 symptoms to stay at home. It also proposed designating Hainan, a tropical island, as a pilot zone to experiment with relaxing controls.
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However, a chaotic, deadly outbreak in Hong Kong alarmed Beijing, and then in March, the virus began spreading in Shanghai. Initially, Shanghai took a light approach, but due to concerns from neighboring provinces, the top leadership stepped in and imposed partial and then total lockdowns in late March and April, respectively.
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The total lockdown caused residents to become angry and frustrated due to lack of supplies, but Beijing made it clear that the lockdown would continue, stressing the importance of “zero-COVID” and persistence.
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After Shanghai locked down, Chinese public health experts stopped speaking publicly about preparing for an exit. None dared openly challenge a policy supported by Xi. Some experts were blacklisted from Chinese media, one told the AP. Gao Fu, then head of the China CDC, hinted at the need to prepare for an exit, and then-Premier Li Keqiang appeared sympathetic to complaints about how zero-COVID was crushing the economy. Public health experts split into camps, with Liang Wannian advocating for zero-COVID and others believing it was unsustainable.
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Health authorities were spooked by unclear data, long COVID and the chance of deadlier strains, and they may have been waiting for the virus to weaken further or for new, more effective, Chinese-developed mRNA vaccines. They didn’t have a sense of urgency, and they thought they had time to optimize the whole process. Risking an outbreak was off the table until the party congress was over.
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The Shanghai lockdown stretched from an expected eight days to two months. By the time Shanghai opened back up, it was just months away from China’s pivotal 20th Party Congress, where Xi was expected to be confirmed for a controversial and precedent-breaking third term. Scientists from Beijing, Shanghai and Wuhan wrote internal petitions urging the government to start preparations, but they were told to stay silent until the congress was over.
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Chinese officials took extreme measures to prevent the spread of omicron, including locking tourists in hotels, indefinite quarantine for traders, and workers living in a state-run ammunition factory.
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In Xinjiang and Tibet, residents were put under brutal lockdown, while those who failed to keep COVID under control were fired.
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As the congress approached, officials began hiding cases, resorting to secret lockdowns and quarantines, and underreporting the number of cases. Local governments spent billions of dollars on mass testing and quarantine facilities, while civil servants were pressed into testing or quarantine duty.
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Beijing residents were bused to distant quarantine centers and asked not to post online about it.
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At the Congress in mid-October, Xi’s loyalists followed him onstage in a new leadership lineup, signalling his total domination of the party.
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Wu Zunyou, chief epidemiologist at China’s CDC, criticized the Beijing city government for excessive COVID controls, saying it had “no scientific basis” and risked “intensifying public sentiment and causing social dissatisfaction.” Zhong Nanshan, a doctor renowned for raising the alarm about the original COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, wrote twice to Xi personally, telling him that zero-COVID was not sustainable and urging a gradual reopening. Business people in finance, trade, and manufacturing were also lobbying authorities behind the scenes.
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Pressure to reopen came from outbreaks flaring up across the country. Sun, China’s top “COVID czar”, summoned experts from sectors including health, travel and the economy to discuss adjusting Beijing’s virus policies. Zhong presented data from Hong Kong showing omicron’s low fatality rate after the city’s last outbreak.
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On Nov. 10, Xi ordered adjustments to adhere to scientific and precise prevention and control. The next day, Beijing announced 20 new measures tweaking restrictions, such as reclassifying risk zones and reducing quarantine times. Xi made clear that China was sticking to zero-COVID and that necessary epidemic prevention measures could not be relaxed.
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The Chinese government wanted to establish order in its response to the Covid-19 pandemic, but its measures caused chaos due to conflicting signals from the top. Local governments were unsure of whether to open or close, and policies changed frequently. In Shijiazhuang, the capital of Hebei province, officials cancelled mass testing and opened the city, only to reinstate harsh measures days later.
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Public frustration with the measures boiled over in late November, leading to nationwide protests. Riot police moved in and the protests were swiftly quelled, but the leadership’s tone shifted, leading to calls for a “zero-COVID” approach to be abandoned. On December 1, President Xi told Charles Michel that the protests were driven by youth frustrated with the lockdowns.
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On December 6, Xi instructed officials to change Covid-19 controls, and the next day, the Chinese health authorities announced 10 sweeping measures that effectively scrapped the controls. This sudden reopening caught the country by surprise and resulted in overcrowding in emergency wards and high prices for antivirals on the black market. To deflect criticism, authorities ordered state media to make a big propaganda push and counter false claims from the US and the West.
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