中国的地方政府在隐性债务中挣扎|日经亚洲 & 财新

  • 随着中国经济在经历了COVID-19大流行病的三年打击后重新走上正轨,解决中国地方政府积累的隐性债务问题再次成为政治议程的首要任务。

  • 对金融系统的风险和地方政府财政的可持续性的关注,从数万亿人民币的隐形负债中延伸到了决策的顶峰。

  • 在4月28日的经济会议上,中国最高决策机构政治局呼吁加强地方政府债务管理,严格控制隐性债务的增加。

  • 中国国家主席和执政的共产党领袖习近平在2月份发表在《求是》杂志上的一篇文章中强调了预防和化解地方政府债务风险。这篇题为 "当前经济工作中的几个主要问题 "的文章摘自习近平在12月的年度中央经济工作会议上的讲话,这是一次重要的决策会议,会议要求加大处理未偿隐性债务的力度。

  • "要夯实省级政府防范化解隐性债务的责任,加大处置未到期隐性债务的力度,优化债务期限结构,减轻利息负担,稳步推进地方政府隐性债务和账内债务统一监管,坚决遏制隐性债务增量,"习近平说,应加强对地方政府融资工具(LGFV)的治理,“帮助它们转型。”

  • 2018年,国务院将隐性债务定义为任何不属于预算内政府债务,但带有明确或隐含的使用财政资金偿还的保证,或由非法担保支持的借款。

  • 它主要包括地方政府融资机构的债券发行、公私合营项目、黑幕贷款合同,以及地方政府用来筹集资金的其他渠道。

  • 国际货币基金组织估计,截至2022年底,包括债券在内的地方政府显性账面债务为35万亿元,而隐性债务可能达到这个数字的两倍。IMF还预测,到2027年,LGFV的债务可能几乎翻倍,达到101.8万亿元。

  • 根据IMF的计算,将需要确认为政府债务的LGFV负债纳入其中后,中国2022年的整体政府债务与国内生产总值的比率将增加一倍以上,从51%增加到110%。

  • 中国财政部对IMF对政府债务的评估提出异议,称2014年通过的修订后的《预算法》明确规定,地方政府融资机构债务的责任由发行该债务的实体承担,中央政府不会来拯救它们。

  • 尽管政府发出了警告,但地方政府还是不遗余力地防止地方政府融资机构违约,因为他们担心不付款会玷污自己的信用度。为了解决隐性债务问题,越来越多的省级和市级政府将与隐性债务有关的任务列入2023年政府报告或预算报告,如加强对地方政府融资平台的监督,建立评估机制,检查和惩处非法举债和欺诈性债务的解决。

  • 中国银行和保险监督管理委员会主任郭树清说,应对金融业风险的措施之一将涉及允许地方政府 "有序地 "进行债务置换。中信证券分析师估计,2023年将有4万亿至4.7万亿元的地方政府隐性债务需要进行置换。贵州、遵义路桥建设(集团)和其他地方政府已经提议发行 “互换债券”,用债务换取地方政府债券,将表外借款纳入其账面。

  • 交换债券计划在2019年的试点中得到了扩展,该计划允许选定的、大多是贫困的县级地区通过与金融机构合作来处理未解决的隐性债务。在一些人所谓的第三轮交换债券发行中,三个富裕的省级地区–上海、北京和广东–发行了本质上是交换债券的债券,以清理其隐性债务。这些债券在地方资产负债表上显示为再融资债券,即地方政府通常为偿还预算内到期债券而发行的新债。

  • 根据广发证券的数据,在2020年末至2022年中发行的事实上的债务交换债券的金额为1.17万亿元。广东和北京都宣布完成了清理工作,尽管他们没有提供债务规模或如何处理的细节。财政部3月份提交给全国人民代表大会的2023年预算报告中没有关于交换债券的规定。

  • 地方政府正在根据2021年4月发布的国务院指导方针建立储备基金以偿还债务。

  • 该准则没有明确规定储备基金是用于隐性债务还是预算内债务。

  • 一些地方政府,如山西和河南,正在努力建立这样一个系统。

  • 湖北省表示,储备基金应至少为地方政府债务未偿余额的5%。

  • 应对隐性债务涉及地方政府接管账外债务,并作为LGFV债务重组的协调者与债权人进行协调。

  • 贵州省是这方面最引人注目的例子。

  • 其他省份,如辽宁省,也在寻求金融机构的帮助。

  • 地方政府正在努力延长或重组高息或到期的隐性债务,以化解金融风险。

  • 他们正通过与银行和公司合作来实现这一目标。

  • 这样做的目的是为了遵守国务院的指导方针。

  • In 2018, the State Council defined hidden debt as any borrowing that is not part of on-budget government debt, but carries an explicit or implicit guarantee of repayment using fiscal funds or is backed by illegal guarantees.

  • It mainly includes bond issuance by LGFVs, public-private partnership projects, shady loan contracts, and other channels used by local governments to raise money.

  • The International Monetary Fund estimated that, at the end of 2022, explicit on-the-books debt of local governments, including bonds, was 35 trillion yuan, while implicit debt likely amounted to double that figure. The IMF also forecast that LGFV debt is likely to almost double to 101.8 trillion yuan by 2027.

  • In 2018, the State Council defined hidden debt as any borrowing that is not part of on-budget government debt, but carries an explicit or implicit guarantee of repayment using fiscal funds or is backed by illegal guarantees.

  • It mainly includes bond issuance by LGFVs, public-private partnership projects, shady loan contracts, and other channels used by local governments to raise money.

  • The International Monetary Fund estimated that, at the end of 2022, explicit on-the-books debt of local governments, including bonds, was 35 trillion yuan, while implicit debt likely amounted to double that figure. The IMF also forecast that LGFV debt is likely to almost double to 101.8 trillion yuan by 2027.

  • The IMF calculated that the inclusion of LGFV liabilities that need to be recognized as government debt more than doubled China’s overall government debt-to-gross domestic product ratio in 2022 from 51% to 110%.

  • The Chinese Ministry of Finance disputes the IMF’s assessment of government debt, saying that the amended Budget Law passed in 2014 made it clear that the liability for LGFV debt lies with the entity that issued it, and that the central government will not come to their rescue.

  • Despite the government’s warnings, local governments go to great lengths to prevent LGFV defaults, concerned that non-payment will sully their own creditworthiness. To tackle hidden debt, a growing number of provincial- and city-level governments have included tasks related to hidden debt in their 2023 government or budget reports, such as strengthening oversight of LGFVs, setting up evaluation mechanisms, and inspecting and punishing illegal debt-raising and fraudulent debt resolution.

  • Guo Shuqing, head of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, said one of the measures to deal with risks in the financial sector will involve allowing local governments to undertake debt swaps “in an orderly manner.” Citic Securities analysts estimated that 4 trillion to 4.7 trillion yuan of local government hidden debt will need to be swapped in 2023. Guizhou, Zunyi Road and Bridge Construction (Group), and other local authorities have already proposed to issue “swap bonds,” where debt is exchanged for local government bonds to bring off-balance-sheet borrowings onto their books.

  • The swap bond program was extended in 2019 in a pilot that allowed selected, mostly impoverished, county-level regions to deal with unresolved hidden debt through collaboration with financial institutions. In what some called the third round of swap bond issuance, three affluent provincial-level regions – Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong – issued what are essentially swap bonds to clean up their hidden debt. These bonds showed up on local balance sheets as refinancing bonds, new debt issued by local governments usually to repay their on-budget maturing bonds.

  • The amount of de facto debt-swap bonds issued between late 2020 and mid-2022 amounted to 1.17 trillion yuan, according to GF Securities. Guangdong and Beijing have both announced the completion of their cleanups, although they did not provide details of the scale of the debt or how it was dealt with. No provision for swap bonds was contained in the Ministry of Finance’s 2023 budget report to the National People’s Congress in March.

  • Local governments are establishing reserve funds to repay debt in accordance with State Council guidelines issued in April 2021.

  • The guidelines did not specify whether the reserve fund is for hidden debt or on-budget debt.

  • Some local governments, such as Shanxi and Henan, are working on such a system.

  • Hubei province said the reserve fund should be at least 5% of the outstanding balance of local government debt.

  • Tackling hidden debt involves local governments taking over off-the-books liabilities and acting as coordinators of LGFV debt restructuring with creditors.

  • Guizhou province is the most high-profile example of this.

  • Other provinces, such as Liaoning, are also seeking help from financial institutions.

  • Local governments are working to extend or restructure high-interest or maturing hidden debt to defuse financial risks.

  • They are doing this by collaborating with banks and companies.

  • This is being done in an effort to comply with the State Council guidelines.